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I. Introduction 
Programs to alleviate poverty in economically distressed urban areas have been 
historically divorced from economic growth policies. Poverty alleviation programs are 
perceived as programs that provide equal opportunity and may not necessarily advance 
economic development objectives. Economic growth policies are typically associated 
with business and industry assistance directed at enhancing productivity and 
competitiveness or providing the financial subsidies that would facilitate private sector 
investment. In the case of backward regions, economic development policies have often 
focused on building the necessary infrastructure which is a precondition for 
industrialization and prosperous commerce. Far from having a neutral impact on 
poverty, this federal policy divide has exacerbated poverty and nurtured the continuation 
of the problem. The current new wave of federalism provides an opportunity to rethink 
the role of the federal government when promoting economic development in distressed 
urban communities. 
Given the historical pattern of categorical program consolidation at the federal level and 
the transferring of authority to state and local jurisdictions, the policy debate is no longer 
whether there will be a consolidation of economic development programs, but what are 
the best alternative approaches to consolidation and how to monitor and manage the 
consolidated programs. The consolidation of economic development programs targeting 
distressed urban communities is a desirable objective in principle. Nevertheless, as the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) experience illustrates, the concomitant 
reduction in funding, the influence of local political interests, and other factors may 
prevent the adoption of block grants from providing the desired flexibility at the local 
level and dampen the overall impact of local initiatives. The Empowerment Zones (EZ), 
Enterprise Communities, initiative of the United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), awarded to selected economically distressed urban areas, 
represents a new generation of block grants in which business and industry-oriented 
strategies are combined with the targeting of poverty-stricken communities and people. 
This new approach offers the conceptual foundations for a much broader convergence 
of growth and equity-concerned policies. 
The objectives of this policy briefing memorandum are two-fold: first, to review the 
historical record concerning economic growth policies, particularly those overseen by 
the Economic Development Administration (EDA), and the experience with block grants 
for urban economic development; and, second, to discuss new roles the federal 
government might play in promoting the convergence of these two broad policy areas. 
All in all, the consolidation of urban economic programs into a block grant could be a 
positive step towards the alleviation of concentrated poverty. But the impact of such an 
initiative largely depends on avoiding the pitfalls that have rendered CDBG ineffective in 
the past. In part, the effectiveness of consolidated funding will depend on the role that a 
central authority plays in monitoring, evaluating, and assisting local governments. 
Understanding that mission may help EDA to gain a leadership role in the redefinition of 
intra-government relations as they relate to distressed urban economies. 
The next section of this work examines EDA's experience in promoting economic 
development, with a particular focus on its assistance to urban communities. The 
discussion is based on the record of recent congressional hearings reexamining EDA's 
mission. In those hearings, there was a strong consensus about the adoption of 
economic development strategies assisting intermediary organizations that strengthen 
industry clusters or sectoral networks. Direct business assistance to enhance overall 
competitiveness in a global economy seems to be more effective when provided 
through a dedicated and focused set of institutions. However, expert witnesses were 
critical of the role that EDA has played in the past in assisting distressed urban 
communities. The major concerns regard the recognition of the distinct problems that 
affect urban centers, the recognition that there is a vast network of institutions that 
provide key links to poor communities and their residents, and the acknowledgement of 
an historical bias against providing economic assistance to urban centers at all. 
The successful integration of general economic development programs and those more 
specifically targeting distressed urban areas--let alone particular Latino, Black, Asian-
American and other such communities--requires an understanding of the problems 
associated with funding consolidation for urban development. The second section of this 
work examines the experience of CDBG since the 1974 consolidation of categorical 
programs for urban development. In many ways, like the EDA's experience, urban 
development strategies evolved from an approach that focused initially on "bricks and 
mortar" into one emphasizing people-based strategies. But as the most recent 
formulation of a people-based or institutional building strategy (as embodied in the EZ 
and other recent initiatives) shows, effective intervention should be focused on both 
people and place, economic institutions and distressed communities. This new 
generation of block grants allows for a more comprehensive view of economic and area 
development. 
The central policy recommendation of this work is that the consolidation of economic 
and urban development programs is a landable objective. Such consolidation may allow 
for greater participation and program flexibility. However, ignoring the pitfalls of the 
CBDG experience with respect to the necessity of community participation could negate 
the potential beneficial impact of such consolidation. Will the resulting guidelines and 
philosophies reflect more of the existing and problematic CDBG-related practices, or of 
the new emerging visions in economic and urban development? The final section of the 
paper examines the factors that may induce one approach to prevail over the other, and 
the central authority role needed for overseeing the successful implementation of 
consolidated funding. 
II. Renewing Growth Policies: Assessing the Role of EDA 
Shortly after President Clinton's administration was installed in office, in March 1994 the 
Subcommittee on Economic Growth and Credit Formation of the Committee on 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives conducted 
public hearings to examine the role of the Economic Development Administration in 
promoting economic development. During three days of depositions, renowned expert 
witnesses testified about new approaches to economic development, the role that state 
and local governments and nonprofit and community-based organizations have played 
in developing best practice, and about the implication of these trends for reexamining 
the mission of EDA. The following summer, the House Subcommittee on Economic 
Development and the Committee on Public Works and Transportation conducted similar 
hearings in which ranking government officials had the opportunity to react to and 
comment upon the many ideas presented earlier. The hearings appropriately expanded 
well beyond the role of the agency and included a broad range of topics related to 
economic development and public policy. These hearings provide a unique starting 
point for examining how the new policy environment may affect the role of the federal 
government in promoting economic development. 
A close examination of the proceedings of the congressional hearings reveals a 
consensus in that the focus on regional clusters of firms, the more specialized industry 
strategies, and the creation of public-private partnerships are promising new directions 
in economic development policy (Atkinson, 1994; Dabson, 1994; Oden, 1994; Open, 
1994; Plosila, 1994; Roberts, 1994). Almost all testimonies, including those of 
representatives from a broad range of economic institutions, endorsed a redefined 
Mission for the EDA that includes: 
• increased coordination, if not consolidation, of federal programs promoting 
economic development;  
• a more selective investment in infrastructure which complements broader local 
development partnerships and programs, maximizes the use of existing facilities, 
and induces the consolidation of business services and centers;  
• a shift from categorical funding to consolidated funding in order to offer localities 
greater flexibility and to allow the provision of loan guarantees to recapitalize 
Revolving Loan Funds (RLF's); and,  
• the use of federal subsidies to leverage private sector investments, to promote 
local collaborations, to support the formation of industry intermediaries, and to 
reward and encourage the adoption and dissemination of best practice.  
A shift in development strategy toward promoting industry clusters and sectoral 
networking is clearly the preferred new direction of the present leadership. In their 
testimonies, both Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown (1994) and former Assistant 
Secretary, now Chief of Staff William Gingsberg (1994), endorsed the proposed new 
policy directions. Current Acting Director of EDA, Philip Singerman, has long been 
associated with one of the most well-known of the state-level "third wave" networks: 
Pennsylvania's Ben Franklin Partnership. 
Despite the emerging consensus regarding EDA's and other agencies, roles in 
promoting economic development, there are potential linkages between economic and 
area development policies and other kinds of programs that have received less 
congressional attention and deserve further discussion. Indeed, an economic growth 
policy need not be divorced from targeting distressed communities in large urban 
centers and economically disadvantaged populations (Montgomery, 1994, Roberts, 
1994). Commerce's Gingsberg (1994) suggests that HUD's Empowerment Zone and 
Enterprise Communities Program offers an opportunity for such bridge-building. In 
particular, the core urban policy of President Clinton's administration encourages the 
development of local strategies to promote the creation of an intermediary base of city-
sponsored public-private business assistance entities, specifically to include the 
participation of the existing network of community development corporations (CDCs) 
and other community-based organizations (CBOs) (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 1995). 
The congressional hearings revealed general key issues regarding the historical 
economic and area development divide. First, there is the need to acknowledge that 
there is still no explicit recognition by EDA of the distinct problems of the very largest 
urban centers, nor any definition of specific growth strategies that correspond to the 
unique problems and the different conditions of these areas, as compared to smaller 
urban centers, rural areas, and distressed regions affected by natural disasters or in 
need of diversifying away from a military-dependent economy. Mature, large urban 
centers which have suffered deindustrilize require an emphasis on the modernization of 
existing manufacturing operations and the corresponding upgrading of the skills of 
existing workers. For big cities, policies aimed at attracting new industries are less 
relevant, there being little open space on which to build brand new facilities. Most urban 
land requires expensive land preparation and clean-up of environmental contamination, 
or the costly rehabilitation of antiquated and inadequate space. Thus, mature and large 
urban centers require an emphasis on industrial retention strategies and effective 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) systems (Leroy, 1994; Croft, 
1994). 
Moreover, EDA and other agencies committed to development need to recognize that 
large urban centers already have a vast network of labor and community organizations 
which constitute an active and experienced set of economic actors who provide a link 
between private sector and government agents and low-income, economically-
disadvantaged populations. The development of grass root organizations is, in part, a 
response to the concentration of blue collar manufacturing jobs and unions in these 
areas, and to the institutionalization of anti-poverty programs and service assistance to 
the poor through community-based organizations. Best practice cases of how these 
labor and community organizations strengthen economic growth policies, specifically by 
linking regional-industry job strategies to disadvantaged populations in high poverty 
neighborhoods, abound (Croft, 1994; Fina, 1994; Phillips, 1994). What these cases 
show in common is the explicit connection between economic development and the 
targeting of specific neighborhoods and economically disadvantaged populations, and 
how such connection is facilitated by the existing network of community-based 
organizations. 
Since its creation in 1965, EDA has been accused of displaying a bias against funding 
of projects in large urban areas, and against supporting networks of CDCs and other 
CBOs (Montgomery, 1994). In part, this bias results from the EDA's emphasis on 
financing public works in lagging (primarily rural) areas, whereas the economic 
development problems of minority communities have been more associated with equity 
and distributional issues. Federal business and industry assistance for large urban 
centers has been channeled mainly through HUD's CDBG and housing appropriations 
rather than through EDA or the Small Business Administration. As suggested above, the 
EZ program offers a unique opportunity to remedy such bias. As part of the EZ 
application process, many communities prepared strategic plans resembling the 
guidelines specified by EDA's Overall Economic Development Program (OEDP) 
(Thomas, 1994). In particular, many large urban centers begun a process of developing 
sectoral strategies resembling very closely those supported by EDA in recent years. 
A restructuring of EDA's funding categories and the authorization of loan guarantees by 
Congress may allow the agency to provide financial assistance to those meritorious and 
innovative economic development projects that were not funded by the EZ initiative due 
to lack of resources in HUD. The consolidation of CDBG and EDA's funding into one 
block grant could, if handled properly, further accelerate the adoption of strategic plans 
and sectoral strategies in large urban centers. This will, however, be difficult to 
implement. As will be discussed below, many aspects of the existing block grant system 
are problematic and have been particularly harmful to low income individuals and 
communities. 
In summary, new directions for economic development policies are promising, but there 
is still a need to recognize the unique concerns of large urban centers. The main topics 
of concern are the conceptualization of economic development problems for urban 
areas, the way in which key urban economic actors participate in the economic 
development process, and the funding mechanisms to promote economic growth. The 
next section examines the economic development experience of urban centers and 
outlines some of the most important lessons of federal urban policies. Particular 
attention is given to the key topics of concern and to the lessons which may assist in the 
design of an effective economic development strategy for urban centers. 
III. The Urban Policy Experience, with an Emphasis on HUD 
It is evident from the previous discussion that economic growth policies during the last 
two decades have emphasized rural and small city regional development, particularly in 
regard to public works, physical infrastructure, and disaster relief. For all the evolution in 
thinking about the advantages of promoting the agglomeration of interrelated firms in 
particular areas, the interdependence of labor and other resources, and the importance 
of the provision of business services, the development policies of EDA and other 
agencies have never given adequate weight to the capabilities of local community-
based organizations as full partners in designing and implementing programs. 
Large urban centers have a unique set of problems and resources that must be 
considered when formulating economic development strategies. Foremost among these 
characteristics is the spatial dimension of industrial restructuring during the 1970s and 
1980s. Manufacturing firms that provided blue collar jobs to residents moved out of the 
inner city, inducing a high level of structural unemployment. The expanding downtown 
business service industries created a more specialized type of job requiring higher 
educational preparation. Given the suburbanization patterns of earlier decades, 
neighborhoods with a large proportion of racial and ethnic minorities--including those 
that have been the destinations of new immigrants from Central and South America and 
from Asia--were the most affected by industrial decline. Inner city neighborhoods 
experienced an extreme concentration of the poor and severe area decay (Wilson, 
1987). In most large urban centers, downtown commercial development never reached 
more than a small number of neighborhood residents. And given historic patterns of 
residential segregation, inner city residents were cut off from access to the emerging 
suburban areas experiencing the greatest job creation (Massey and Denton, 1993). 
As regards federal responses to the complexity of economic problems affecting large 
urban areas, a significant portion of federal funding for big cities was consolidated, in 
1974, into the CDBG, managed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
The evolution ( urban renewal, Model Cities, housing loans, and other federal 
categorical grants) of federal urban economic development policy, and the transition 
from categorical funding to block grants, offer a unique set of lessons for the present 
reconsideration of the proper role of government generally. The enactment of the CDBG 
and the redefinition of federal and state responsibilities during the Nixon and Ford 
administrations marked a rupture with the Great Society programs of the previous 
Kennedy-Johnson era. The consolidation of programs addressed the tension between 
services and community institution building on the one side, and "bricks and mortar" 
activities emphasized by urban renewal programs on the other (Farmharn, 198 1; Bach, 
1977). 
The first wave of the "New Federalism" also changed the concept of what constitutes 
the institutional base of communities to promote economic development. To begin with, 
funding for social services through community-based organization, and the significant 
assistance to those CBOs for housing and real estate projects, created a vast 
institutional base for economic development at the community level. These CBOs 
played a critical role in the implementation of anti-poverty strategies, even as welfare 
"reform" and small business development favored providing cash allowances directly to 
individuals and guaranteed loans or outright grants to minority small businesses 
(Heilbrun- 198 1). Nixon's "Black Capitalism" promoted economic development by 
supporting entrepreneurship in impoverished neighborhoods (Harrison, 1974). The 
advent of CDBG (accompanied by the greatly decentralized approach to job training 
embodied in CETA) followed naturally on these approaches. 
The early years of the Reagan administration witnessed yet another wave of "New 
Federalism." This time, however, proactive local government and CBOs were no longer 
the principal agents of the federal policy makers. Rather, President Reagan shifted 
resources away from social and human services and promoted market-oriented 
economic policies. Beginning with the 1981 budget, the administration in Washington 
extended block grants to become the policy tool of choice to implement a new set of 
relationships between the federal and state governments. More than thirty programs 
providing health and mental health, alcohol, drug abuse, community, and social services 
were consolidated into seven block grants (Weyer, 1985). Although states were given 
more discretion on allocations, the federal government retained its authority to define 
the purpose and mission of the grants and to monitor the use of the funds. However, 
overall funding was reduced by 20-25 percent below pre-Reagan levels. As a case in 
point, between 1980 and 1986, real federal expenditures for area and regional 
development declined by 53 percent (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989). The governance 
of job training was turned over to local Private Industry Councils under JTPA; in most 
cases these councils were oblivious to (if not actively antagonistic towards) CBOs. 
The clear pattern of shifting responsibility for policy and program design to the state and 
local levels, and the significant budget cuts when compared to the Great Society years, 
forced local authorities to become more pro-active in economic development activities 
(Osborne, 1987). At the same time, the revenue base of cities and states was eroded by 
economic decline and the cost of tax incentives and infrastructure subsidies offered to 
attract businesses to the area (Fosler, 1988). The aforementioned factors raise some 
serious concerns regarding the implementation of block grants. Many localities 
continued to fund programs without seeking functional integration, instead replicating 
previous funding categories. To add to that, there was no assurance that the programs 
were adequately serving the disadvantaged population which (some of them) were 
intended to serve (Farham, 1981; Weyer, 1985). 
The main problems associated with the implementation of block grants, particularly 
manifested during the early years of the CDBG, were the increasing dispersion of efforts 
and the dilution of funding (Bach, 1977). In part, these problems resulted from the 
allocation formulae and eligibility criteria established by HUD, and in part to the 
politicizing of funding allocation resulting from shifting the grants from community 
organizations to local authorities (Kettl, 1979). Another important factor was that 
Congress, facing increasingly tight budgets, distributed program benefits broadly among 
districts in order to form winning legislative coalitions (Wrighston and Conlan, 1988). 
The end result of block grants at the local level was to shift resources from hard-core 
poverty areas to marginally deteriorated areas, and from support for community-based 
organizations to assistance to mostly mainstream business. By way of illustration, a 
recent General Accounting Office (1994) report estimates that 45 to 60 percent of 
CDBG funds focus on financial assistance to business. At the state government level, 
the "anti-urban" bias of block grants was also manifested by the shifting of funding from 
the inner-city to the suburbs. Equally important was the shift of federal resources away 
from the more urbanized areas of the northeast to benefit the sunbelt and western 
regions (Vaughan, Pascal, and Variana, 1980). 
An examination of the urban agenda proposed by the Clinton administration suggests 
that area-specific policies are coming once again to the forefront of anti-poverty 
strategies. This in no small measure is a response to the social unrest experienced in 
large urban centers in recent years, notably the civil disturbance in Los Angeles 
(Johnson and Farrell, 1993). The new administration wanted to become a more active 
participant in promoting urban community economic development by increasing funding, 
by promoting new programs, and by encouraging a more deliberate articulation of 
community-based and economic development programs (Clinton and Gore, 1992). The 
EZ initiative was to be the major manifestation of this priority. 
Thus, in 1994 HUD designated eight Empowerment Zones and sixty-five Enterprise 
Communities. These programs encourage the development of public-private 
partnerships in small business development, community planning, and social 
development. A key challenge to the HUD and local planners was to build into this 
explicitly urban development program elements of best-practice third wave thinking that 
had previously ignored the special problems of big city communities of color. As we saw 
above, over the last two decades states have moved from supporting traditional blue-
collar, labor-intensive manufacturing industrial parks to targeting bio-tech and 
microelectronic firms (Ross and Friedman, 1991; Blakely and Nishikawa, 1991; Fosler, 
1988; Chimura, 1987). And, at the federal level, an enterprise zone program, following 
the traditional industrial park model based on limited tax incentives, was first discussed 
during President Reagan's administration and later supported by President Bush's 
administration (Kaplan, 1995). There is a realization, however, that industrial parks and 
state-sponsored enterprise zones have a limited impact on distressed communities. 
Most of the industrial parks are located far from the inner-city and public transportation, 
and are rarely connected to employment and training or to minority-owned small 
business promotion. Very rarely do states require affirmative efforts to train the 
disadvantage in exchange for tax abatements and other subsidies. In any case, tax 
incentives are less effective in job creation than programs that provide direct assistance 
to business in recruiting and training workers, or that match firms to suppliers or 
distributors. 
HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros (1987), however, regards the connection or links 
between people and places to be not only desirable but possible. Branch plant 
operations that have implemented training programs in collaboration with community-
based organizations have tended to be more successful in recruiting the unemployed 
and unskilled workers from surrounding communities. Similarly, branch plants that 
subcontracted small businesses from the surrounding areas have had a greater impact 
on local economies. In this view the dichotomies of place and people, or business 
service oriented and human service oriented strategies, are overcome. The new 
approach to urban development emphasizes that successful economic development 
should be oriented to focus on growth industries, promote the integration of business 
support and human service development, and should target economically distressed 
communities. The advantage of funding EZ's through blocks grants in the future is that it 
promotes a comprehensive view of economic and area development. But the challenge 
remains to create the links of the EZ's to community-based organizations, which in 
many instances mediate relations with local residents and small businesses. 
There is an emerging consensus among urban economic development professionals of 
the benefits of combining strategies, since no one area-specific policy has enough 
impact on the local community to reduce poverty or improve the economy of distressed 
communities in a significant way. Most studies assessing the employment or income 
multiplier effects of small businesses, branch plants, and other initiatives indicate that 
their impacts are relatively small (Selvarajah, 1991; EDIC, 1991; Bates, 1989, Heilburn, 
1981). These findings point to the need for combining strategies at the community level. 
One such critical linkage is that between EZs and community development 
corporations. On the one hand, EZs emphasize traditional business strategies while 
CDC's are organizations with a focus on the economic development of a specific area. 
As Gittel and Wilder (1995) have stated, "The activities of CDCs and [Enterprise Zones] 
each have value in their own right. However, there is growing recognition of the 
potential benefits from linking economic and community development efforts, 
particularly in areas with concentrated poverty that lack the resources to effectively 
engage in or attract traditional forms of private development." (pp. 1-2) The combination 
of policies at the community level is more likely to have a synergistic effect on poverty 
alleviation than the implementation of programs that have little connection between 
them. 
An important way in which EZs may enhance the effectiveness of urban economic 
programs is by attracting private sector investments by leveraging federal funding and 
coordinating business services. The combined impact of reductions in federal support 
for urban programs and the decline in the revenue base of states and cities has greatly 
reduced funds for community economic development. EZs are intended by design to 
promote private sector participation through loan guarantees, tax abatements, and other 
policy tools. In particular, EZs initiatives seek to coordinate business services within a 
location and to combine these services with recruitment, employment readiness, 
training, counseling and other complementary human resources services. The 
concentration of programs in facilities situated near the targeted communities will be 
particularly beneficial to minority and women owned businesses. The decline in the 
share of loan guarantees for black-owned businesses, for instance, responds to both 
the policy changes in SBA and the lack of a support system for technical assistance and 
financing provided at the local level. 
Block grants appeal to fiscally conservative policy makers because they reduce the role 
of the federal government in specific policy areas and transfer responsibilities to state 
and local officials. However, since the introduction of block grants has always resulted 
in overall funding reductions, in the short-run the states and municipalities have to cope 
with the impact of such decline in program capacity and can not reap the benefits of 
greater flexibility to respond to local needs and to integrate programs to increase 
effectiveness. Block grants for urban development have also disrupted community 
participation in program implementation and adversely affected access to resources for 
low income communities. Thus, the contradictory effects of block grants many times 
negate the intended policy goal for which they were enacted by Congress. However, the 
experience of the last two decades indicates that block grants have increased their 
reach to more policy areas, and are likely to be extended to economic development and 
other related federal programs in the near future. 
Yet an examination of the EZ initiative points to the potential benefits of block grants 
and, through this avenue, to a redefined role for the federal government in promoting 
the dual objectives of economic growth and a fair distribution of its benefits. The EZ 
strategy incorporates the traditional objectives of economic development policies by 
focusing on business services and industries. But the EZ strategy also recognizes that 
the focus of economic development should be to exploit existing economies of 
agglomeration and to provide the opportunities for the increased corporate and 
business relations of clusters or networks of firms. Moreover, EZs add a focus on 
economically distressed urban communities and recognize the mutual additional 
benefits of connecting inner-city residents to expanding business and employment 
opportunities. A second generation of blocks grants, by leveraging private sector 
investments and promoting community participation, may actually provide, as Bach 
(1977) proposes, the basis for "a more balanced federalism." 
IV. Towards the Integration of Economic Development and Urban Federal 
Programs 
The previous historical assessment of federal policy indicates that there is a long term 
trend towards the consolidation of functions into more flexible block grants and the 
reduction of categorical funding to state and local governments. The continuous 
consolidation of previously disparate programs seems to be not only likely but also 
desirable in certain contexts. The experience with federal urban intervention, however, 
highlights the pitfalls of block grants. Particularly in the early years, there were serious 
distributional issues, and today, the promised flexibility may not be accomplished in the 
face of substantial budget reductions. Given this context, it is likely that Congress will 
pursue a redefinition of the mission and scope of existing programs and of the 
administrative entities that oversee economic development policies. Obviously, 
regarding urban centers, there is an overlapping of functions between the EDA 
programs, Community Development Banks, Small Business Administration programs, 
CDBG, and the EZs initiatives, among others. The new Congress is moving boldly to 
consolidate funding for the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) and the Perkins Act into 
one training and vocational skills block grant. As of late-August of 1995, the House 
version of the legislation "would connect more than 100 programs into four block grants" 
while the Senate proposal would combine all programs into a single block grant (School 
Board News, 1995:7). The consolidation of economic development grants is likely to 
follow in similar fashion. The central questions are whether urban economic 
development programs should be consolidated and, if so, can the consolidated block 
grant avoid the pitfalls of previous experiences in serving distressed urban 
communities? 
As regards consolidation and devolution (shifting greater program authority away from 
Washington), there is a range of options open to policy makers. Conceivably, the 
consolidation of programs into one or several block a-rants could be preceded by a joint 
call for proposals from states and city governments for a portion of the EDA's funding 
dedicated to urban centers and, for instance, for the reappropriation of HUD's funding 
for the EZ program. In this scenario, EDA would jointly define the context and priorities 
of urban economic development and monitor the programmatic intervention at the local 
level. In particular, EDA would focus on monitoring the integration of economic 
development and urban policies, on how economic development initiatives targeting 
distressed urban communities are connected to regional clusters of growing businesses 
and industries. Thus, even when we answer in the affirmative the question of whether 
urban economic development programs should be better coordinated or even 
consolidated, the question of how to avoid some of the problematic aspects of blocks 
grants for urban economic development needs still to be addressed. 
Unquestionably the most important concern regarding the implementation of block 
grants has to do with their redistributive impact. As argued above, the transferring of 
authority to localities politicized the allocation process and resulted in the dispersion of 
efforts, the dilution of funding, and the shifting of resources among large urban centers 
and away from northern cities. In the last few years, however, Congress and the 
different administrations have moved towards targeting federal funding to the most in 
need and hardest to serve populations. Consider as an illustration the recent revamping 
of employment and training and educational programs. The JTPA guidelines were 
revised to focus services on AFDC recipients. The policy intent was to concentrate 
efforts on an especially hard to serve population. Similarly, recent changes in the 
allocation formula of Title I funding for public schools mandate stricter poverty criteria. 
The intention of these changes in regulations is to concentrate resources in fewer 
schools with the children in greatest need of supplementary educational programs. The 
new guidelines equally emphasize more flexibility for funding allocations, and lift 
restrictions for the population that could be served within qualifying schools. Obviously, 
policy makers are aware of the impact that funding cuts are having on targeted 
populations and are making sure that programs are more focused and serve the more 
disadvantaged populations. 
The concerns for equity and the redistributive impact of federal policy need to be 
understood in a broader context of the redefinition of the role of the federal government, 
its relationship to state and local governments, and the implications of changing 
responsibilities at the different governmental levels. Richard Nathan (1975), who was 
President's Nixon's advisor on intergovernmental relations, provided a conceptual 
framework for the first "New Federalism". According to Nathan, the guiding principles of 
providing government assistance to the poor would be to provide transfer payments to 
individuals and to shift human and community service delivery programs to state and 
local governments. The decentralization of services to the poor from the federal 
government should be provided on a broad basis to the states. Nathan's arguments 
continue to offer the rationale for a more expansive use of vouchers for the poor and for 
block grants for the states. However, how these principles could be extended to the 
economic and urban development context requires a more detailed assessment. 
Foremost among the functions of a central government is the establishment of a line of 
authority or the appropriate uniform boundaries for policy implementation. For Nathan, 
federal intervention is appropriate where there are clear spillover effects from one 
region to another, as in the case of environmental pollution. On this account, economic 
development issues are largely concerned with regions, and policy interventions inside 
clearly defined political demarcations have less clear justification. Businesses enter 
relations with suppliers, distributors, and customers which are often spread throughout 
and across broad geographical areas. In like manner, the objective of EZs is precisely 
to link economically distressed communities to growing opportunities in the wider 
region. Direct. subsidies to business, such as tax abatements, do not work well in 
encouraging job creation, particularly when targeting disadvantage populations, or when 
directing investments to particular distressed areas (Krumbolz, 1991). In sharp contrast 
to other policy areas where there are well established markets (e.g. housing, food 
distribution), targeted job creation and distressed urban area development require the 
provision of direct services on a regional basis. 
For discussion purposes, Nathan's principles for the restructuring of government 
functions can be grouped into four broad areas of program implementation or 
programmatic intervention by all government levels: planning, development, monitoring, 
and diffusion. The planning stage of the intervention cycle involves the understanding 
and definition of the problem and the needs assessment of the targeted population. In 
this initial phase of program development, policy makers establish the geographical and 
population targets, define the missions and goals of the programs, and create a 
governance structure which may include the participation of the representatives of the 
community or group served. The division of government functions is evolving towards 
greater responsibilities for the states regarding the definition of regions and the 
establishment of administrative structures, while local governments are better at 
enticing the participation of a broad range of actors and interests in the process. Bolton 
(1993) suggests that the key role for the federal government is to establish the ranking 
of community needs and establish priorities criteria. Establishing the ranking of needs 
for distressed areas is a straight forward process for which there are well developed 
methodologies (Dommel and Rich 1987). Based upon these guidelines, the central 
authority allocates funding and monitors states' compliance with legislative intent. 
The federal government plays a fundamental role in setting the context in which 
community-based economic development takes place (Bolton, 1993; Duncan, 1986). A 
redefinition of the scope of federal responsibilities regarding economic development 
must begin by recognizing the adverse impact of economic changes on urban 
economies and the implications of those changes for "poor and minority people, laid-off 
industrial workers, small farmers, and other conflict in the historic transition we are 
witnessing" (Duncan, 1986:24). Central authority is needed not only to direct resources 
to distressed areas but also to prevent wealthier communities from discriminating 
against the poor through zoning and other restrictions that contribute to the 
agglomeration and isolation of the poor (Bolton, 1993). 
Development is the second phase of the intervention cycle. Once economic needs are 
established and program objectives are clear, state and local governments design and 
implement programs that respond to those conditions. Federal funding allows the 
establishment of demonstration programs, particularly when helping disadvantaged 
populations (Yin, 1980). For Nathan, new areas of intervention are about the few 
justifications for the continuation of categorical and more targeted grants. To the extent 
that pronounced regional infrastructural inequities are no longer of primary concern and 
EDA adopts a new economic development focus, to that extent there is a growing 
rationale for transferring business promotion authority (attraction, retention, incubation) 
and public facilities development to state and local governments. In this context, a 
consolidated block grant for urban economic development that facilitates the integration 
of business promotion and place-specific strategies is desirable. 
However, federal funding is critical for defining a local policy agenda (Weyer, 1985). 
Even when the definition of needs and local priorities is left to local governments, 
central authority guidelines establishing key principles guiding economic development 
strategies are necessary. These principles should broadly reflect the consensus that, 
rather than helping individual businesses per se, programs should strengthen industry-
based intermediaries that promote collaborations and the development of more 
integrated networks of interrelated and interdependent firms. These programs should 
have specific links to small businesses and workers in distressed communities. To 
achieve these central objectives, local governments should promote private sector and 
community participation in the governance structure of the programs. Expenditures on 
public facilities, and capacity budding for intermediary organizations, must be required 
to have a broad range of funding leveraging and investment commitments from the 
private sector (Bartik, 1993). 
Planning and development functions are at the core of "New Federalism" initiatives and 
have framed most of the congressional debates in past decades. There is little 
contention about the federal role in monitoring programs and the diffusion of effective 
intervention practices, although the current resistance of governors and mayors to 
"unfunded mandates" from the federal government certainly challenge the legitimacy of 
the promulgation of national standards and guidelines. The Nixon-appointed task force 
on intergovernmental relations, which marked a turning point for federal 
decentralization, regarded accountability, research, and the dissemination of research 
findings as key legitimate functions of a central government. The CDBG experience 
illustrates some of the most problematic aspects of the decentralization of planning and 
development functions to local governments without having a strong monitoring system 
in place. In the first instance, CDBG has produced a "disjointed scattering of projects" 
around urban centers, rather than an integrated planning process necessary for the 
success of urban revitalization (Kleinberg, 1995). The lack of concentrated impacts 
results in part because of the short horizon of local officials and the political pressures 
on federal and local governments for a widespread distribution of funding (Kettl, 1979; 
Wrightson and Conlan, 1988). 
Furthermore, once programs are funded they tend to become institutionalized. The 
longer the initiatives are funded, the less likely they are to be unfunded. The issue is not 
the recognition of the need for long-term support for certain initiatives in order to have 
an impact, but rather the inability to adapt programs to new circumstances or to 
reallocate resources to programs of greater priority. With block grant funding, reductions 
are likely to occur across the board without clearly targeting and eliminating ineffective 
programs. Evidently, central authority is needed to establish criteria for evaluation of 
program impacts and performance standards to which all jurisdictions are accountable. 
A recent General Accounting Office (1994) report outlines some of the job quality and 
economic development performance measurements that could serve as the basis for 
uniform standards in a consolidated urban economic development grant. The report 
suggest that job quality is indicated by the level of pay and fringe benefits, and by the 
potential for skill development, pay increases, and promotion opportunities. Although 
the determination of these criteria will vary with economic conditions in different areas 
(e.g., a "low wage" job in N.Y.C. might be considered quite desirable in San Antonio), 
local governments must develop mechanisms to assess program impact on 
participants. The relevant question, and a hard one to measure, is what would have 
occurred in the absence of the program. In addition to job creation and quality, other 
indicators of economic performance for an area could include the impact of the program 
in enhancing the community's tax base, the amount of public and private funding 
leveraged by the program, and the extent to which essential services and facilities are 
created. In the case of business-oriented assistance programs, it is also important to 
take into account the type and size of business assisted and the level of loan defaults 
by grantees. The GAO report found a possible misuse of CDBG funds as signalled by 
high default rates among for-profit businesses. All in all, the report endorses the 
flexibility provided by block grants to adapt economic development strategies to local 
needs but strongly recommends the adoption of guidelines to assist communities to 
develop their own objectives and performance measures and to measure success 
against their own objectives. 
The role of central authority when assessing jurisdiction's compliance with performance 
standards needs to go beyond efficiency considerations (is this program providing the 
greatest impact at a given cost?) to effectiveness consideration (are the programmatic 
responses to local needs appropriate to achieve national objectives?). Nathan's 
principles of "New Federalism" contemplated that research and dissemination, and by 
implication data collection, are appropriate responsibilities for the federal government in 
a decentralized system of human and community services. In this context, best practice 
research goes beyond program evaluation parameters to assess whether policy makers' 
intent, regarding programmatic mission and objectives, has been achieved. In this 
capacity, the federal government assumes the primary responsibility for the replication 
and diffusion of effective responses to an identified need. Ultimately, research offers the 
foundation for establishing policy frameworks, i.e. the assessment of responses to 
social problems and the establishment of criteria for changing or proposing new 
legislation. 
Even with the establishment of a consolidated urban economic development block grant 
the federal government would need a specialized office to coordinate and promote 
research and dissemination focused on the stated objectives. Since much research is 
contracted to universities and local agencies, the central authority must develop a cadre 
of skilled program officers to monitor data collection and analysis. 
V. Policy Recommendations 
To recapitulate, the consolidation or coordination of funding to assist distressed urban 
communities is a laudable objective. It can potentially allow greater ownership of the 
economic development problem at the local level and provide more flexibility for 
program design and implementation. However, the CDBG experience suggests that, if 
not closely monitored, the short-term redistributive impact of such consolidation could 
negate legislative intent. Recent experiences with the decentralization of federal 
programs indicate that Congress has responded to equity concerns by mandating 
stricter eligibility criteria to achieve a more targeted impact on disadvantaged 
populations. Enforcing this principle of social justice should be a sine qua non for the 
next wave of "New Federalism." 
Certainly the EZs initiative makes targeting long-term poverty areas central to 
programmatic objectives, and it does so considering the importance of linkages to 
growing business and industries. A revamping of CDBG along similar lines is both 
desirable and necessary. EDA and SBA programs should be similarly re-focused. 
Whether the EZ experiment will work or not largely depends on establishing the 
linkages between growing industries and distressed urban communities. Those linkages 
strongly depend on the sense of ownership and participation that engages industry, 
local government, and community leaders. 
At a minimum, greater inter-agency coordination and collaboration to foster, enforce, 
and evaluate the success of these emergent partnerships is desirable. Ideally, however, 
federal policy will move aggressively to provide the context for greater community 
participation and a more explicit fink between poverty areas and their residents and 
expanding industries and businesses. In this regard, racial and ethnic identity and 
solidarity play a crucial role in fostering the economic development of the inner city 
(Swamstrom, 1993.) 
More broadly, the discussion about possible consolidation of funding for distressed 
urban communities is a step in the right direction. In monitoring the consolidation of 
current categorical programs into a block grant the federal government should 
designate one agency to oversee the four key areas of programmatic intervention as 
they affect urban centers. As long as the economic development of distressed urban 
areas is concerned with the connections of those places to business and industry in the 
wider regional economy, to that extent there is a justification for a central authority that 
facilitates planning, assists with development, establishes performance standards, 
evaluates impacts, and coordinates data collection and research. 
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